Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law
Volume 16

Issue 2

Article 3

5-1-2016

Effects of Settlement Between a Local Company and a Host State
in a Bilateral Investment Treaty Claim of Foreign Shareholders
Arising From the Same Conduct
Gonzalo Vial

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gonzalo Vial, Effects of Settlement Between a Local Company and a Host State in a Bilateral Investment
Treaty Claim of Foreign Shareholders Arising From the Same Conduct, 16 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. Law
98 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol16/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized
editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Effects of Settlement between a Local Company and
a Host State in a Bilateral Investment Treaty Claim
of Foreign Shareholders Arising From the Same
Conduct
Gonzalo Vial*
Abstract
This work analyzes the different approaches adopted by ICSID tribunals
regarding the effects that a settlement between a local company and the host
State has on the bilateral investment treaty claim of foreign shareholders arising
from the same conduct. It proposes a solution based on a distinction of the
remedy pursued and the admissibility of the claim, finding support in the
separation between treaty and contractual claims and in the civil law doctrine of
unjust enrichment.
Key words: settlement, effects, local company, host State, foreign shareholders,
treaty and contractual claims, unjust enrichment.

I. THE PROBLEM
Foreign investments can be subject at the same time to the obligations set
forth in a bilateral investment treaty and in the specific contract of a particular
enterprise, usually subject to the laws from the host State. 1 Thus, if the same
conduct involves a breach of the treaty and the contract, two possible dispute
resolution procedures can be initiated.
One of the possibilities to terminate a dispute of that kind is with a settlement
between the local company and the host State. However, in some situations
*
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foreign shareholders may consider that the optimal way of preserving their rights
is not through the commented settlement, but with the presentation of a claim
under a bilateral investment treaty.
This work analyzes the effects that a settlement between a local company and
the host State has on the bilateral investment treaty claim of foreign shareholders
arising from the same conduct.
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
Investment treaty arbitration case law presents two different views regarding
the effects that a settlement between a local company and the host State has on
the bilateral investment treaty claim of foreign shareholders arising from the
same conduct.

2

One states that the settlement does not prevent foreign

shareholders to exercise a bilateral investment treaty claim, 3 while the other
affirms that a previous agreement regarding the conduct that originated the claim
“. . . preclude the investor from proceeding with an international action against
the State.”4
Both positions have their own advantages. The first approach correctly
distinguishes between the personality of the foreign shareholders and the local
incorporated company, recognizing that they could have different interests.5 In
addition, it differentiates the rights that investors have under a bilateral
investment treaty from those that the company has in the local jurisdiction where
it operates. 6 Furthermore, it safeguards the chance of foreign shareholders to
defend themselves through a bilateral investment treaty claim in cases where the
settlement was adopted in an improper way.7

2

Daniela Paez-Salgado, Effects of Settlements in Investor-State Arbitration, KLUWER
ARBITRATION
BLOG
(Feb.
24,
2015),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/02/24/what-are-the-effects-of-a-settlementagreement-between-the-locally-incorporated-company-and-the-host-state-on-the-foreignshareholders-pending-bit-claim/.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. (“[O]n a real case, the board of directors of El Triunfo Company in El Salvador
fraudulently ratified a petition for bankruptcy before the local courts so that the company
could enter into winding up proceedings to intentionally dismantle the investment of its
shareholders”).
6
Id.
7
Id.
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On the other hand, the second approach that precludes an investor’s bilateral
investment treaty claim after a settlement is reached might help avoid
contradictory decisions between different tribunals, and it may also reduce the
risk of double recovery that can occur with the exercise of two different judicial
actions stemming from the same facts.8
Any potential solution to the commented problem must consider these
conflicting interests.
III. ICSID CASE LAW
Three ICSID cases illustrate the positions adopted under investment
arbitration case law regarding the effect a settlement between a local company
and the host State has on the bilateral investment treaty claim of foreign
shareholders arising from the same conduct. 9 In the following lines a brief
analysis of each one of them is conducted.
A. Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic
Sempra Energy International was a U.S. company that invested in two
Argentinean firms: Sodigas Pampeana S.A. and Sodigas Sur S.A. In turn, these
companies were the principal owners of two Argentinean gas distribution firms:
Camuzzi Gas Pampeana and Camuzzi Gas del Sur.10
In 2002, after changes were made to the regulatory framework applicable to
their investment, Sempra presented a request for arbitration to the ICSID,
invoking the provisions contained in the 1991 bilateral investment treaty between
Argentina and United States.11 The tribunal found that the regulatory measures
adopted by the respondent breached both the fair and equitable treatment
standard and the umbrella clause established in the treaty, and thus awarded
damages to the claimant based on the loss of fair market value of its equity.12
In what concerns this work, during the course of the allegations the
Argentinian Republic asserted that Sempra Energy International had no right to
present a claim because Camuzzi Gas Pampeana and Camuzzi Gas del Sur had
8

Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Original Proceeding, Award (Sep. 28, 2007), paragraph 228.
9
Paez-Salgado, supra note 2.
10
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Original Proceeding, Award (Sep. 28, 2007).
11
Id. at paragraph 5.
12
Id. at paragraph 440 and number 1 of the decision of the Tribunal.
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negotiated a new tariff regime with the Argentinean government. 13 In other
words, there was already an agreement between the local companies and the host
State settling the controversy. On its side, the US firm alleged that it had not
participated in the said agreement, and therefore, it was not obliged by it. 14
The tribunal declared the admissibility of the claimant’s allegations, deciding
that Sempra Energy International was still an investor whose interests were
protected by the bilateral investment treaty between Argentina and United States,
stating in paragraph 227 of the award the following:
“[T]he Claimant is still an investor whose interests
are protected by the Treaty, it cannot be bound by
an agreement between different entities to the extent
that those interests have not been adequately
satisfied. The agreements are to this effect res inter
alios acta.” 15
As it can be observed, the tribunal held that a settlement between a local
company and the host State could not affect a party that: (1) was not part of the
agreement; and (2) whose interests have not been adequately protected. Along
this line, it is also possible to argue that a third party could be bound by a
settlement if their interests have been “adequately satisfied.”
Regarding the potential beneficial outcomes to the shareholders -arising from
the agreement between the host State and the local company-, the tribunal held
that they should be considered in the valuation of damages, as appreciated in
paragraph 228 of the award:
“[T]he agreements do have consequences for the
Claimant in view of the fact that there are objective
outcomes that benefit the Licensees to an extent…
objectively the agreements will improve the
business of the Licensees and to that extent the
Claimant will also benefit as a shareholder… will be
examined… in the context of valuation.”16
In conclusion, in order to determine whether a settlement between a local
company and the host State binds foreign shareholders, the tribunal of this case
distinguished whether the said agreement affected the shareholder’s interests
positively or negatively. It seems that the arbitrators left the door open to a
13

Id. at paragraph 225.
Id. at paragraph 225.
15
Id. at paragraph 227.
16
Id. at paragraph 228.
14
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bilateral investment treaty claim in both scenarios because they sustained that
even when the settlement benefited the shareholders, it should be considered in
the “context of valuation,” a task that is proper of a tribunal, thus implying the
admissibility of the claim. 17
B. SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic
In this case, 18 the claimant was the French company Sauri,19 who controlled
100% of the shares in Aguas de Mendoza S.A., which in turn acquired 32.08% of
Obras Sanitarias de Mendoza, a corporation with an administrative concession
for the service of drinking water in the Mendoza province in Argentina.20 The
claimant alleged that some conducts of the Argentinean government amounted to
a violation of a bilateral investment treaty signed with France in 1991.21
Relevant to this work, the tribunal forced Sauri to suffer the effects of an
agreement between Obras Sanitarias de Mendoza (the local company) and an
agent of the Argentinean government: the Mendoza province, called the “Second
Letter of Understanding.” 22 In this regard, the arbitrators stated in paragraph 358
of the decision on jurisdiction and liability the following:
“The subjective effect of res judicata affects in the
first place the parties that reached the transactional
agreement: OSM and the Province. But its effects
applies also to Sauri, the shareholder that controls
OSM because Sauri cannot treat as causing an
expropriation those measures which its own
subsidiary has considered as settled.”23
In summary, the tribunal stated that a settlement between a local company
and the host State bound the foreign shareholders, departing from what was held
in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, where the arbitrators
17

Id. (Indeed, damages are only going to be evaluated in the context of a claim that was
already admitted, otherwise it would not be necessary to discuss their valuation).
18
SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4.
19
A wholly owned subsidiary of another French company, called Societé
d´Aménagement Urbain et rural S.A., or SAUR. SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4. Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (June 6,
2012), paragraphs 25 and 26.
20
Id.
21
SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4. Award
(May 22, 2014), at paragraph 80.
22
Id. at paragraphs 65-67.
23
Paragraph 358 of Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (June 6, 2012) at SAUR
International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4.
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sustained that foreign shareholders were not obliged by an agreement that
negatively affected their interests.
C. Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic
In this case,

24

the claimant was Hochtief Aktiengesellchaft and the

respondent was the Argentine Republic. 25 As part of a consortium, Hotchief
Aktiengesellchaft was adjudicated a concession to construct, maintain, and
operate a toll highway and a bridge. 26 In order to perform the concession contract;
the firm formed the corporation Puentes del Litoral S.A. 27 The claimant alleged
breach of provisions contained in a bilateral investment treaty between Argentina
and Germany. 28
In what concerns this work, the tribunal made a clear distinction between
contract claims derived from the concession contract and treaty claims, whose
source was the bilateral investment treaty between Argentina and Germany, 29
and to which even minority shareholders were entitled. 30 This has been explained
in the following terms:
In the same way, the tribunal in Hochtief had to
address a very similar issue when the majority of
members in a consortium settled a claim with the
government and the claimant did not. The tribunal
recognized two independent causes of action, one
under municipal law and another one under treaty
law. Then, the tribunal concluded that the “question
must be addressed within the particular context of
the BIT, and not by proceeding from principles of
municipal company law.” The decision reasoned
that since there was no evidence that the claimant’s
rights under the BIT were transferred to the local
24

Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on
Liability (Dec. 29, 2014).
25
Id.
26
Id.at paragraph 1.
27
Id.at paragraph 68.
28
Id.at paragraph 1.
29
Paez-Salgado, supra note 3.
30
Paragraph 171, Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31,
Decision on Liability (Dec. 29, 2014). In this regard the tribunal stated the following:
“The Tribunal will first address the argument that the Tribunal should not admit a claim
made by Claimant in respect of rights that belong to PdL. As was noted in the Decision
on Jurisdiction, Article 1(1)(b) of the BIT is unequivocal in stipulating that an investment
includes “Shares, stocks in companies and other forms of participation in companies.”
Further, the Protocol to the BIT specifies that the definition of an investment includes
“specifically those capital investments that do not entitle their holders to voting or control
rights.” Minority shareholdings are thus clearly included.”
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company to take action in his own name, the
claimant retained his standing to bring claims with
respect to the treatment of his shareholding under
the BIT.31
Later, the tribunal addressed the issue of double recovery, which could have
occurred in this case because Hochtief Aktiengesellchaft was protected by the
bilateral investment treaty between Germany and Argentina and was also part of
the concession contract. 32 Regarding this matter, the arbitrators explained in
paragraph 180 of the decision on liability that even assuming that the double
recovery existed, “it [was] a matter concerning the remedy rather than the
claim . . . To the extent that there may be a possibility of double recovery, that is
a matter to be taken into account in the context of the need to prove and to
qualify loss . . .” 33
Summing up, the tribunal sustained that foreign shareholders were in a
position to exert their treaty rights even if there had been a previous agreement
between the local company and the host State. If that is the case, the said
settlement shall have to be considered in the valuation of damages, particularly
“in the context of the need to prove and to qualify loss.” 34

IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
REMEDY PURSUED AND ITS ADMISSIBILITY
The cases analyzed in section III of this work (first “Sempra”, then “Saur,”
and, finally, “Hochtief”) illustrate that when it comes to the effects of a
settlement by a local company and the host State in the bilateral investment treaty
claims of foreign shareholders arising from the same conduct, it is possible to
distinguish between the remedy pursued by the said claim and the admissibility
of it.
Regarding the remedy, the tribunals agreed that a settlement by a local
company and the host State could affect the content of what a party may be
awarded, particularly the quantity of the alleged damages. Indeed, in Sempra the
31

Paez-Salgado, supra note 2.
Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on
Liability (Dec. 29, 2014), paragraph 180.
33
Id.
34
Id.
32
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arbitrators found that the positive effects of an agreement between third parties
should be considered at the moment of valuating the damages suffered by
shareholders arising from the conduct of the original claim. 35 In turn, in Saur the
tribunal forced the shareholders to suffer the effects of an agreement called the
“Second Letter of Understanding.”36 Finally, in Hochtief the arbitrators affirmed
that the issue of double recovery was “a matter to be taken into account in the
context of the need to prove and to qualify loss…”37
However, the identified ICSID procedures addressed in different ways the
effects that a settlement by a local company and the host State has on the
admissibility of a bilateral investment treaty claim by the foreign shareholders
arising from the same conduct. Indeed, while the tribunal in Saur established that
the res judicata effects of a transaction bound the shareholders,38 in the other two
cases the arbitrators estimated that bilateral investment claims were admissible
even with the existence of previous agreements; always in Hochtief, and when
the interests of the shareholders were negatively affected in Sempra, as
appreciated from the analysis conducted before.
It seems that the position adopted in Hochtief is the most suitable to protect
both the interests of foreign shareholders and the host States. Indeed, the clear
separation of contract claims and treaty claims made by the tribunal allows
foreign shareholders to always assert their bilateral investment treaty rights,
while the consideration of previous agreements in the valuation of damages
prevent host States from being condemned twice for the same conduct.
It is true that the tribunal in Sempra seems to reach similar conclusions, but
the fact that the award used the expression “. . . to the extent that those interests
have not been adequately satisfied . . .”, 39 allows arguing that if a particular
agreement is beneficial for the foreign investors, they might be bounded by it.
Thus, the conceptual distinction between contract claims and treaty claims is not
35

Paragraph 228, Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Original Proceeding, Award (Sep. 28, 2007).
36
SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4. Decision
on Jurisdiction and Liability (June 6, 2012), paragraph 358.
37
Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on
Liability (Dec. 29, 2014), paragraph 180.
38
Paragraph 358 SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/4. Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (June 6, 2012)
39
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Original Proceeding, Award (Sep. 28, 2007), paragraph 228.
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drawn as clearly as in Hochtief, seeming to be conditioned to the outcome –
positive or negative- of the settlement between the local company and the host
State.
In sum, the decision in Hochtief illustrates that it is not necessary to forbid
the presentation of a bilateral investment treaty claim in order to avoid double
recovery after a settlement is reached; it is enough to consider the effects of the
said agreement in the valuation of the alleged damages. This is the better way to
preserve both the interests of the foreign shareholders and the host States.

V. BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION PROPOSED
The solution proposed implies that contract claims are different from the
claims that arise from a bilateral investment treaty. Otherwise, the settlement
reached by the host State and the local company would preclude any further
action regarding the same conduct. In addition, it requires the existence of a law
principle forbidding a party to benefit twice from compensations arising from the
same facts.40
A. Distinction Between Treaty And Contractual Claims
Currently the differentiation between treaty and contractual claims is a
“standard feature of recent investment arbitrations.”41 As further evidence of their
importance, scholars have even developed tests in order to distinguish them. 42
Therefore, a settlement reached between the local company and the host State
does not preclude the actions available under a bilateral investment treaty.
B. The Civil Law Doctrine Of Unjust Enrichment
The principle of unjust enrichment is an equitable concept created to remedy
injustices that occur where one person makes a contribution to the property of
another without a valid cause.43 As stated, “consistent reliance supports the idea
40

For instance, if treaty claims are not precluded after a settlement is reached, the host
State could face the risk of paying twice for the same conduct: the first time through the
said settlement and the second time because of a condemnation under a treaty claim.
41
Christoph Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID)
15-30 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams ed., 2007), available at
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/85_cspubl_86.pdf.
42
HEGE ELISABETH KJOS, A PPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2013)
43
This is a simple definition given only for the purposes of this article. However, the
truth is that defining unjust enrichment is not an easy task. As one author noted, “Unjust
enrichment eludes definition, its imprecise nature simultaneously lending itself to and
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that unjust enrichment is a general principle of international law,” and it could be
an important tool in the context of international investment arbitration if “used
precisely and sparingly.”44
Under the aforementioned concept, a party cannot become richer without a
valid justification.45 Therefore, the principle of unjust enrichment allows a party
to be compensated only once from the damages suffered by a particular set of
facts, thus avoiding the risk of double recovery.
However, a question remains of “when” the principle should be applied
during a procedure. The decisions in Hochtief and Sempra can be used to support
that the principle of unjust enrichment should play a role at the moment that the
tribunal determines the quantum of the damages. Indeed, in Hochtief the tribunal
affirmed that the issue of double recovery was “a matter to be taken into account
in the context of the need to prove and to qualify loss…”,46 while in Sempra the
arbitrators sustained that the positive effects of a settlement between third parties
should be considered at the moment of valuating the eventual damages
suffered. 47
Summing up, the principle of unjust enrichment could be useful to avoid the
risk of double recovery derived from the separation between treaty claims and
contract claims, being possible to recognize at least one procedural moment in
which it could be applied: the valuation of damages by the arbitrators.

CONCLUSION
A settlement between a local company and the host State does not preclude
the right of foreign shareholders to exercise a bilateral investment treaty claim,

defying misapplication.” Ana Vohryzek-Griest, Comment, Unjust Enrichment Unjustly
Ignored: Opportunities and Pitfalls in Bringing Unjust Enrichment Claims Under ICSID,
YALE LAW SCHOOL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 6 (2008), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=student_p
apers.
44
Id. at 1, 4.
45
As explained by an author, “the law repudiates the enrichment of somebody at the
expenses of other without a valid cause”. Daniel Peñailillo, El enriquecimiento sin causa.
Principio de derechos y fuentes de obligaciones, REVISTA DE DERECHO UNIVERSIDAD DE
CONCEPCIÓN, 5 (1996), available at file:///C:/Users/usuario/Downloads/2575.pdf
46
Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on
Liability (Dec. 29, 2014), paragraph 180.
47
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Original Proceeding, Award (Sep. 28, 2007), paragraph 228.
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but the said settlement has to be considered by the tribunal at the moment of
determining an eventual compensation in order to avoid double recovery. The
aforementioned is supported by the ICSID decision in Hochtief, the assented
distinction between treaty and contractual claims and the applicability of the civil
law principle of unjust enrichment in the field of international investment
arbitration.

